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1. INTRODUCTION 
Expert advice is crucial to the discipline of efficient markets. Both individual and institutional 
investors benefit from expert advice in several forms among the most important of which are equity 
analysts’ stock recommendations (hereafter, stock recommendations) and debt analysts’ credit ratings 
(hereafter, credit ratings). Previous research has documented the incremental informational contents of 
stock recommendations (Baik & Park, 2003; Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, & Trueman, 2001; Jegadeesh 
& Kim, 2006; Jiang & Kim, 2016; Liu, Smith, & Syed, 1990; Menéndez-Requejo, 2005; Wormac, 
1996) and credit ratings (Blanco, Brennan, & Marsh, 2005; Boot, Milbourn, & Schmeits, 2006; Chung, 
Ann Frost, & Kim, 2012; Creighton, Gower, & Richards, 2007; Goh & Ederington, 1993; Hand, 
Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1992; Holthausen & Leftwich, 1986; Hull, Predescu, & White, 2004; Kliger 
& Sarig, 2000; Norden & Weber, 2004; J. Wang, Svec, & Peat, 2014). According to these previous 
studies and many others, stock recommendations drive equity markets and credit ratings affect both 
equity and debt markets (i.e. bond and credit default swap “CDS” markets). Hence, it can be argued 
that stock recommendations partially reflect the market risk included in trading a certain stock, whereas 
credit ratings partially reflect the credit risk or default risk included in trading a certain bond. 
Although much literature has focused on the informational contents of stock recommendations and 
credit ratings and how their bias could affect the efficiency of equity and debt markets, to the best of 
our knowledge, no previous research has investigated the reputational effects of such expert advice. The 
major reason for such a lack of this type of research is the obvious difficulty of measuring reputational 
risk. Hence, we exploit the unique opportunity of the quantifiable reputational damage known to be 
caused by operational risk announcements in financial institutions2 to gauge the incremental 
reputational effects of stock recommendations and credit ratings beyond any firm-level factors, event-
specific features and announcement-related characteristics. 
Our main argument in this paper is that operational risk announcements constitute an unexpected 
arrival of bad news disclosing the operational loss amount and reflecting the event-causing internal 
control weaknesses (ICWs) and other relevant firm-level deficiencies. Hence, this adverse idiosyncratic 
informational shock hitting the financial markets should cause investors to revise their prior beliefs 
about the expected amounts and probabilities of cash flows (i.e. valuation and creditworthiness) of the 
loss firm, thus imposing a reputational impact beyond the nominal equity-depleting operational loss 
amount (Cummins, Lewis, & Wei, 2006; Gillet, Hübner, & Plunus, 2010; Plunus, Gillet, & Huebner, 
2012). Since a crucial part of these prior investors’ beliefs are inevitably formed by expert advice (i.e. 
stock recommendations and credit ratings), we argue that such a reputational impact would be partially 
determined by the loss firm’s stock recommendation favorability and credit rating level. 
                                                          
2 See Section 2.1. for a detailed review of the literature on operational and reputational risks in financial institutions. 
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There are two competing theories in the literature that might explain the reputational effects of stock 
recommendations and credit ratings around operational risk announcements. First, the “Expectancy 
Violation Theory” (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006), whereby the unexpected arrival of bad news would 
seriously violate prior optimistic investors’ expectations, hence, accentuating the adverse reputational 
effects in firms with more favorable stock recommendations and higher credit ratings. In this case, 
expert advice would be a reputational burden on the loss firm. Second, the “Institutional Legitimacy” 
theory (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006), whereby expert advice provided by well-established institutions 
(e.g. equity analysts working for brokerage houses and debt analysts in credit rating agencies) gains 
escalating credibility (i.e. legitimacy) and becomes more difficult to be challenged by less informed 
investors. Hence, non-expert equity investors would expect firms with more favorable stock 
recommendations and higher credit ratings to continue to have more robust financial performance and 
less risky business profile in the future, thus making them more resilient to the adverse consequences 
of the announced operational risk events and more able to remedy their underlying causes. In this case, 
expert advice would serve as a reputational asset of the loss firm. 
In this Paper, we have two main objectives. First, given the competing theories and mixed empirical 
evidence in the literature about how investors behave around reputation-damaging events, we aim to 
introduce and analyze empirical evidence drawn from the financial industry on whether and why stock 
recommendations and credit ratings could act as a reputational asset or reputational liability upon the 
unexpected arrival of bad news into financial markets. Second, we aim to enhance the prediction models 
of the reputational damage caused by operational risk announcements through including expert advice 
variables (i.e. stock recommendations and credit ratings) that reflect the prior beliefs/expectations of 
more informed investors3.  
Our study contributes to the literature on reputational risk and expert advice in several ways. First, 
this is the first paper to empirically examine whether stock recommendations and credit ratings could 
serve as a reputational shield in a business context. Second, we update the literature on the determinants 
of reputational risk by adding a new dimension which is the most recent expert advice. Finally, this 
paper provides evidence based on a post-global financial crisis sample (2010 – 2014) that is more recent 
than any other empirical study on the factors affecting the reputational risk triggered by operational risk 
announcements in the financial industry. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops 
our testable hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the research methodology, including sample selection, 
variables tested and empirical models. Section 4 presents and discusses our main empirical results. The 
                                                          
3 It is well-established in the literature that equity and debt analysts get access to much private information through different 
channels among which are their connections with the firm’s management. Hence, it is expected that analyst’s stock 
recommendations and credit ratings would drive the trading behavior of other less informed investors, especially individual 
(household) investors and liquidity traders (See Sections 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. for a more detailed discussion of the relevant 
literature). 
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results of further analysis and robustness checks are presented and discussed in Sections 5 and 6, 
respectively. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Review of the Literature on Operational and Reputational Risks 
Financial firms are unavoidably subject to reputational risk4 as a result of operational risk event 
announcements5. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS) definition of operational 
risk6 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006) and evidence provided by the literature 
(Chernobai, Jorion, & Yu, 2011; Cummins et al., 2006; T. Wang & Hsu, 2013) show that operational 
risk event announcements reveal serious problems in internal control systems, potential fraudulent or 
opportunistic behavior on the part of management and employees, and ultimately weak tone-at-the-top 
corporate governance mechanisms in financial firms. Additionally, previous research found consistent 
evidence of the adverse reputational effects of large operational risk event announcements in the 
financial industry, as reflected by a drop in the market values of loss firms by more than one-to-one for 
internal fraud and non-fraud internally-caused operational losses (Cummins et al., 2006; Fiordelisi, 
Soana, & Schwizer, 2014; Gillet et al., 2010; Perry & Fontnouvelle, 2005; Sturm, 2013b)7.   
Plunus, Gillet, & Huebner, 2012 documented an adverse impact of operational risk announcements 
on cumulative abnormal bond returns on both the first press-cutting date and firm recognition date. 
They interpreted their results as “pure” reputational damage since operational risk losses usually do not 
deplete shareholders’ equity and therefore should not be directly relevant to the expected cash flows 
received by creditors. In agreement with Gillet et al.'s, 2010 and disagreement with Sturm's, 2013b 
results on stock returns, Plunus et al., 2012 found that debt markets react favorably to settlement 
announcements. Sturm, 2013a inspected the impact of operational risk announcements on CDS markets 
in European banks and found that CDS spreads increase only around settlement announcements and 
when the relative operational loss size is higher. He interpreted these results as indicating that some 
                                                          
4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009, p.19) defines reputational risk 
as “… the risk arising from negative perception on the part of customers, counterparties, shareholders, investors or regulators 
that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain existing, or establish new, business relationships and continued access 
to sources of funding (eg through the interbank or securitisation markets). Reputational risk is multidimensional and reflects 
the perception of other market participants. Furthermore, it exists throughout the organisation and exposure to reputational 
risk is essentially a function of the adequacy of the bank’s internal risk management processes, as well as the manner and 
efficiency with which management responds to external influences on bank-related transactions.” 
5 We use the terms “operational risk event announcements” and “Operational risk announcements” to indicate the same thing 
which is the first press-cutting announcement on a certain operational risk event in the public media news. 
6 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, p.144) defines operational risk 
as “…the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This 
definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk.” 
7 For example, suppose that the market value of a firm dropped as a result of an announcement of an operational risk event. 
Then, a drop in the market value of three-to-one means that the magnitude of the market value drop is three times the magnitude 
of the operational loss. Hence, only one-to-one drop in the loss firm’s market value is to be considered a mechanical market 
reaction to the operational loss amount disclosed whereas any excess drop in the market value would be considered a 
reputational loss. 
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characteristics and timings of operational risk announcements cause an increase in the bank’s default 
risk. We also believe that Sturm's, 2013a results confirm the debt-based “pure” reputational damage 
caused by operational risk announcements previously documented in bond markets by Plunus et al., 
2012. 
  
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. Equity Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 
Analysts’ stock recommendations reflect the favorability which highly informed investors and 
experts, that is equity analysts, believe to be involved in trading a particular stock. Stock 
recommendations range in a descending order of favorability from “Strong Buy” to “Buy” to “Hold” to 
“Underperform” to “Sell. Obviously, the more favorable the stock recommendation, the more inclined 
the less informed equity investors and liquidity traders would be to invest in this particular stock, thus 
causing the stock price to appreciate. 
Chang & Chan, 2008 found that the negative reaction of equity markets to downward stock 
recommendations is more than double the positive reaction to upward stock recommendations. 
Menéndez-Requejo, 2005 documented a positive (negative) equity market reaction to “Buy” (“Sell”) 
stock recommendations in a Spanish business context. Several other studies similarly confirmed the 
positive (negative) impact of “Buy” (“Sell”) stock recommendations on stock prices (Beneish, 1991; 
Davies & Canes, 1978; Desai, Liang, & Singh, 2000; Ferreira & Smith, 2003; Liu et al., 1990). Wormac, 
1996 found strong and persistent equity market reactions to extreme changes in stock recommendations 
(i.e. stocks added to or removed from “Buy” and “Sell” recommendations) over a one-to-six-month 
period following the recommendation changes. Barber & Loeffler, 1993 documented the positive 
equity-based informational impact of stock recommendations published in the Wall Street Journal’s 
monthly ‘Dartboard’ column. However, Barber, Lehavy, & Trueman, 1999 found that equity investors 
would not incrementally benefit from stock recommendations made by top-ranked analysts. In addition, 
Barber et al., 2001 also found that a stock-recommendation-driven investment strategy would not 
necessarily be profitable, especially after controlling for transaction costs. Moreover, Desai & Jain, 
1995 found that money managers do not provide informative stock recommendations in relation to long-
term stock performance. 
These results reported in the stock recommendation literature are obviously mixed and call for 
further research to examine the differential effects of stock recommendations on equity markets under 
various market conditions. In this paper, we choose to investigate the impact of stock recommendations 
on the subsequent reputational damage to stock prices around operational risk announcements. We are 
interested in finding whether favorable stock recommendations would actually mitigate or accentuate 
the reputational damage which the financial firm could incur around operational risk announcements. 
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We find it important to examine this reputational effect of stock recommendations from two 
perspectives. First, from the equity investor’s perspective, our findings would guide their investment 
strategy and let them more accurately predict the equity market over-reactions or under-reactions 
associated with specific stock recommendations around operational risk announcements. Second, from 
the loss firm’s perspective, our findings would advise their post-announcement reputation repair 
strategy and whether favorable stock recommendations could be sufficient as a protection shield against 
any reputational damage caused by operational risk announcements. 
Previous research showed that prior good reputation could serve as either a reputational 
asset/protection or reputational liability/burden around reputation damaging events  (Gatzert, 2015; 
Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). From one side, a good reputation, that is backed up by well-established, 
legitimate and institutionalized expert advice, could make investors more confident in the ability of the 
affected firm to overcome the consequences of the loss event and repair its causes, thus triggering less 
adverse reactions from investors; we call this interpretation the “Institutional Legitimacy” theory 
(Minor & Morgan, 2011; Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Schnietz & 
Epstein, 2005). From the other side, a good reputation (i.e. more favorable expert advice) could become 
a liability of the firm because prior optimistic investors’ expectations have not been met, thus provoking 
investors to more aggressively penalize highly reputable firms following reputation damaging events; 
this is called the “Expectancy Violation Theory” (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & 
Graffin, 2006).  
In the case of operational risk announcements in financial institutions, the “Expectancy Violation 
Theory” interpretation might prevail for two reasons. First, financial institutions are known to have high 
information asymmetry due to complex business models, heavy regulation and supervision schemes 
and severe conflicts of interest among shareholders, managers, creditors and public interests (Srivastav 
& Hagendorff, 2016). Such an information opacity would suggest that the financial industry is more 
likely to have the interrelationships of market risk (as partially implied by stock recommendations), 
credit risk (as partially implied by credit ratings) and operational risk (whose data is usually confidential 
and unavailable to the public) mispriced. Hence, operational risk announcements are more likely to 
inject new private information, thus reducing extant information asymmetry levels (Barakat, Chernobai, 
& Wahrenburg, 2014) and correcting previous mispricing in the equity and debt markets. Second, the 
empirical evidence in the reputational risk literature documents that larger and more profitable financial 
firms with higher credit ratings are exposed to a more severe reputational damage (Fiordelisi, Soana, & 
Schwizer, 2013; Sturm, 2013a). 
Hence, upon the unexpected arrival of news, less informed equity investors and liquidity traders (i.e. 
naïve investors) would be inclined to revise their prior beliefs formed by the most recent stock 
recommendations. If those unexpected pieces of news reveal adverse information about the affected 
firm, as it is the case for operational risk announcements in financial institutions, naïve investors could 
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then aggressively correct their prior optimistic beliefs and more heavily sell stocks with ex ante 
favorable stock recommendations. In this sense, the reputational damage caused by operational risk 
announcements could be an ex post correction of equity markets due to a strong revision of ex ante 
investors’ expectations.  
Additionally, since “Buy” stocks represent the most favorable stock recommendation in our sample, 
a big adverse correction of prior optimistic beliefs of equity investors around operational risk 
announcements could be expected for such stocks. Moreover, since “Hold” stocks imply the most long-
term investment recommendation, this type of stock could be expected to incur the least severe equity-
based reputational damage around operational risk announcements because the typical investor, seeking 
abnormal long-term returns, would simply continue to hold such stocks. 
Furthermore, less heterogeneity in stock recommendations reflects lower market risk for investors 
and higher cross-sectional stock returns (Baik & Park, 2003; Harrison & Kreps, 1978). Hence, the 
unexpected arrival of bad news in the form of operational risk announcements would constitute a bigger 
surprise for firms with less dispersed stock recommendations, thus likely causing a more severe 
reputational damage. 
However, according to the “Institutional Legitimacy” theory, it is plausible to theoretically argue 
that more favorable and less heterogeneous stock recommendations could serve as a reputation-
protection vehicle whereby investors believe that such firms have forthcoming stronger performance 
and wealthier pool of economic resources that enable them to more efficiently absorb the adverse 
consequences of the announced operational risk events and more effectively remedy their fundamental 
causes. Hence, more optimistic and less dispersed expert opinion could help protect rather than damage 
the firm’s reputation upon the unexpected arrival of bad news. 
Therefore, given the competing theories and mixed empirical evidence in the literature, we formulate 
our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: There are reputational effects of stock recommendations around operational risk 
announcements in financial institutions 
 
2.2.2. Debt Analysts’ Credit Ratings 
Analysts’ credit ratings indicate the creditworthiness of the rated firm (i.e. its ability to honor the 
cash flow obligations of its liabilities; especially the repayments of interests and principals of its bond 
issuances) as evaluated by highly informed experts, that is credit rating agencies. The credit ratings 
generally range from “Prime” (AAA) to “In Default” (D)8. Obviously, the higher the credit rating level, 
the more inclined the less informed debt investors and liquidity traders would be to invest in the 
                                                          
8 The credit rating levels used in this paper are based on the classifications of Standard & Poor's (S&P) long-term ratings. 
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respective firm’s bonds, thus increasing the market valuation of those bonds. Moreover, credit ratings 
are generally split into two major groups from the debt investor’s perspective; Investment Grade “IG” 
and Speculative (Non-investment) Grade “SG”. Speculative Grade firms/bonds are rated BB+ or lower 
and are sometimes termed “Junk Bonds”; they generally imply a much higher default risk than 
Investment Grade firms/bonds. Therefore, debt investors require a much higher return (i.e. due to a 
higher default risk premium) on their junk investments. 
The impact of credit rating announcements on equity markets is quite controversial due to the known 
conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders. For instance, Maxwell & Stephens, 2003 found 
that credit ratings are more likely to be downgraded following open market share repurchases which 
increase the shareholders’ wealth to the detriment of creditors’ investments. Therefore, we include 
credit ratings as a control variable in our regressions modelling the equity-based reputational impact of 
operational risk announcements (although we are still interested in analyzing any inferences that can be 
drawn from their respective coefficients estimated in our multivariate equity-based regressions).   
However, the impact of credit rating announcements on the CDS markets is more straightforward. 
In a recent study, Wang et al., 2014 studied the informational contents of credit rating updates in the 
Australian CDS market and found that credit rating updates have a slight negative impact on abnormal 
CDS spreads (i.e. positive impact on the implied default risk) and that outlook updates impose no 
significant effect on CDS markets. We add to the findings of Wang et al., 2014 by inspecting the 
reputational implications of credit rating levels around reputation-damaging operational risk 
announcements in financial institutions. We argue that our findings would benefit both the debt 
investors and the loss firm itself. For the debt investors, our findings provide evidence regarding the 
impact of credit rating levels on the implied default risk, thus enhancing the quality of the debt investor’s 
investment decision around operational risk announcements. Second, our findings help the loss firm’s 
management evaluate the extent to which their current credit rating level might serve as a reputation-
protection mechanism around operational risk announcements and whether they would need further 
post-announcement actions to restore their firm’s reputation. 
Previous research has found a positive association between the incidence of operational risk and 
credit risk in financial institutions (Chernobai et al., 2011). Hence, it could be posited that debt investors 
ex ante expect that firms with higher credit rating levels will incur more frequent and/or more severe 
operational risk events. Hence, the unexpected arrival of bad news in the form of operational risk 
announcements could violate the prior expectations of debt investors, thus causing a more serious debt-
based reputational damage for firms with higher credit rating levels. In line with this proposition, Sturm, 
2013a found that CDS markets react more adversely to operational risk announcements in firms with 
higher credit ratings.  
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However, according to the “Institutional Legitimacy” theory, credit ratings could act as a 
reputational shield since debt investors might view firms with higher credit rating levels (e.g. “IG” 
firms) as financially stronger and economically more stable, thus making such firms less vulnerable to 
bankruptcy following the announcements of operational risk events. Hence, debt investors could give 
firms with legitimate, institutionalized and more favorable creditworthiness the benefit of the doubt and 
penalize them less harshly upon the unanticipated release of the bad news. 
Therefore, given the competing theories and mixed empirical evidence in the literature, we formulate 
our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: There are reputational effects of credit ratings around operational risk announcements in 
financial institutions 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample Selection and Composition 
The sample selection procedure is reported in Table 1. We begin with all 16,110 public 
announcements from the commercial ORIC International database which spans the period 1921 – 20159. 
Since ORIC announcements were only regularly collected starting 2010, our sample period covers the 
post global financial crisis (post-GFC) years (2010 – 2014). We exclude announcements before 2010 
and after 2014, announcements in non-financial firms (because the nature of operational risk is clearly 
different from that in financial institutions), announcements in loss firms not headquartered in USA, 
Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan (to coincide with previous operational risk studies that mostly 
focused on advanced economies), announcements which have no clear operational risk classification 
(i.e. no event type or business line), announcements whose dates are not confirmed or full-text news 
articles not found (we have double-checked and downloaded available full-texts of operational risk 
announcements from LexisNexis news database) and announcements in privately held financial firms. 
To reduce noise in the data due to simultaneous market reactions to other types of announcements, we 
also exclude 98 operational risk announcements overlapping with earnings announcements or credit 
rating announcements (i.e. two trading weeks before and after the operational risk announcement). In 
addition, the only two announcements associated with “Underperform” stock recommendation are 
removed. Finally, 18 operational risk announcements are dropped due to missing data on variables 
collected from DataStream and Bloomberg.  
                                                          
9 ORIC International is a company that collects and reports both public and private operational loss data 
(www.oricinternational.com). In this paper, we use data from the public database, which consists of identified operational risk 
events around the world. Search algorithms are used to collect the data from the Internet. For this paper, the ORIC International 
data was extracted in March 2015. 
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Hence, we end up with our final sample comprising 255 operational risk announcements from 81 
financial institutions publicly listed in 20 countries which hit the public media news during the years 
2010 – 2014 (Table 2, Panel A). Our final sample enables the generalization of our results as its size 
exceeds the sample sizes in most of previous studies on operational and reputational risks such as 115 
events (1974 – 2004) in Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005), 103 events (1994 – 2006) in Gillet et al. 
(2010), 71 events (1994 – 2006) in Plunus et al. (2012), 99 events (2004 – 2010) in Sturm (2013a) and 
136 events (2000 – 2009) in Sturm (2013b); with the exception of 492 events (1978 – 2003) in Cummins 
et al. (2006) and 430 events (1994 – 2008) in Fiordelisi et al. (2014). 
Our final sample is also well diversified as it encompasses 16 different industry subtypes of financial 
institutions (according to the Bloomberg classification) with most of the sample coming from banking-
related activities (187/73%) and the remaining events belonging to brokerage-related activities (19/8%), 
wealth and investment management-related activities (34/13%), and insurance-related activities 
(15/6%) (Table 2, Panel B). 
[Insert Tables 1 & 2 here] 
3.2. Variables Tested and Data Sources 
3.2.1. Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 
We collect data on the most recent consensus equity analysts’ stock recommendations which are 
issued at least two trading weeks before each operational risk announcement from Bloomberg database. 
The data on consensus stock recommendations is collected and coded for our empirical analysis in a 
cardinal scale as follows: 1 for “Strong Buy”, 2 for “Buy”, 3 for “Hold”, 4 for “Underperform” and 5 
for “Sell”. Obviously, favorability of the stock is decreasing in the cardinal scale used with the highest 
favorability for 1 and least favorability for 5. Our final sample comprises 108 “Buy” stocks and 147 
“Hold” stocks (Table 2, Panel C). 
We use the median stock recommendation to proxy for the central tendency of the most recent 
consensus stock recommendations. More specifically, we code a dummy variable Buy Stock 
Recommendation as 1 if the median of most recent consensus stock recommendations is “Buy” and 0 
otherwise. To examine the impact of the heterogeneity of analysts’ opinions regarding the favorability 
of the stocks, we employ the continuous variable StDev Stock Recommendation which is the standard 
deviation of the most recent consensus stock recommendations.
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3.2.2. Credit Ratings 
Debt analysts’ credit ratings reflect the credit risk involved in lending to a particular firm. Higher 
credit ratings obviously indicate a better creditworthiness of the borrowing firm. Credit ratings are 
subject to updates from time to time, when debt analysts find reasons to change their beliefs on the 
credit rating itself (i.e. upgrade or downgrade) or the intermediate-term outlook of the creditworthiness 
of the borrowing firm (i.e. positive, stable or negative). Since our sample includes no sufficient variation 
in the credit rating outlook data10, we focus our analysis on credit rating levels (i.e.  “Prime” AAA to 
“In Default” D) and credit rating classifications (i.e. Investment Grade “IG” versus Speculative Grade 
“SG”).  
We collect data on the most recent Standard & Poor's long-term, local issuer credit rating updates 
before each operational risk announcement from Bloomberg. Since the relationship between credit 
ratings and default risk is known to be non-linear, we convert our credit ratings into the corresponding 
default probability using the global corporate average cumulative default rate (five-year horizon) of 
S&P long-term local issuer credit rating from 1981 to the year preceding the operational risk event 
announcement date. We use a five-year horizon because we are interested in the long-term reputational 
implications of operational risk announcements and to coincide with the five-year CDS spread data that 
is used to capture the debt-based reputational impact of operational risk announcements. Data on 
transition matrices is collected from the “Annual Global Corporate Default Study And Rating 
Transitions” reports published annually by S&P Global and summarized in Appendix B. We name this 
variable Credit Rating Level. 
Additionally, to capture the average equity-based and debt-based reputational differences across the 
two major credit rating groups from the debt investor’s perspective, we construct a dummy variable 
Speculative Grade that is coded 1 if the most recent credit rating of the loss firm is BB+ or lower and 0 
otherwise. 
We were able collect credit rating data for 223 out of 255 announcements. The highest (lowest) 
credit rating level in our sample is AA (B-). In addition, 12% of our sample are Speculative Grade firms 
(Table 2, Panel D). As reported in Table 3, Credit Rating Level has an average (median) of 1.69% 
(0.69%) with a minimum (maximum) of 0.25% (28.76%). 
 
                                                          
10 In our sample, 221 out of 223 most recent credit rating updates have a “Stable” outlook. 
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3.2.3. Equity-based Reputational Damage 
Following the literature on operational risk announcements (Fiordelisi et al., 2014, 2013; Gillet et 
al., 2010; Perry & Fontnouvelle, 2005; Sturm, 2013b), we measure the direct equity market reaction to 
operational risk announcements using the cumulative abnormal stock return (𝐶𝐴𝑅) estimated by the 
single-index market model with the estimation period being a window of 250 trading days ending one 
calendar month before the announcement date. We use a more conservative approach reflected in a 
shorter event window (-5,+5). We collect data on stock prices and local market indices from 
DataStream. 
Also, following the literature on reputational risk (Fiordelisi et al., 2014, 2013; Gillet et al., 2010), 
we measure the equity-based reputational damage using the loss-adjusted 𝐶𝐴𝑅 (hereafter, Reputational 
Return or 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅) which we compute according to the following formula: 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) = 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) + |
𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(−5, +5)
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(−6)
| 
We measure market capitalization six trading days before the announcement date to exclude any 
impact on the firm’s market value caused by the leakage of private information in the trading week 
preceding the announcement date. We consider 𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(−5, +5)  to be zero when no 
operational loss amount is disclosed during the event window (-5,+5). Since we use a relatively short 
event window (-5,+5) which is clean from any other announcements, we believe that  𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) 
accurately measures the pure reputational impact (i.e. non-mechanical market reaction to the 
information disclosed in the operational risk announcement).  
Table 3 shows that the mean 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) is 0.82% (p-value= 0.0608) which indicates no 
reputational damage on average in our sample, thus contradicting previous papers on operational and 
reputational risks (Fiordelisi et al., 2014, 2013; Gillet et al., 2010) and hence gives a strong motivation 
to examine the factors which have caused this different result.  
We estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model to extract the equity-based 
reputational impact of analysts’ stock recommendations around the announcement of an operational 
risk event 𝑖 incurred by the loss firm 𝑗 during the event window (−5, +5): 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5)
= 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗
+ 𝛽3 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽10 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 +  𝛽12 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑗
+ 𝛽13 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽14 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽15 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽16 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗
+ 𝛽17 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽18 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽19 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽20 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗
+ 𝛽21 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
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According to the particular version of the model estimated, 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 could be 
either the median (i.e. Buy Stock Recommendation) or dispersion (i.e. StDev Stock Recommendation) of 
the most recent consensus stock recommendations preceding the operational risk event announcement. 
Similarly, dependent on the version of the model tested, 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗 could be either Credit Rating 
Level or Speculative Grade (as defined in Section 3.2.2.). 
Since almost 48.60% of our sample announcements are associated with non-negative 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) (i.e. supposedly not incurring an equity-based reputational damage) (Table 3), we 
devise a logit regression model to distinguish between firms incurring reputational damage and firms 
not incurring reputational damage around the operational risk announcement. In this sense, we look into 
how analysts’ stock recommendations affect the likelihood of reputational damage. Our proposed logit 
model is more conservative than the order logit model used by Fiordelisi et al., 2013 who defined 
reputational damage as 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅 in the lowest third of the 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅 distribution (even if it is non-negative).  
We estimate the following binary logit model to estimate the impact of analysts’ stock 
recommendations on the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage around the announcement of an 
operational risk event 𝑖 incurred by the loss firm 𝑗 during the event window (−5, +5): 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑟 (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)
Pr (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) ≥ 0)
)
= 𝜂𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛿2 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗
+ 𝛿3 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛿4 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛿5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛿6 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+  𝛿7 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛿8 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛿9 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛿10 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛿11 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 +  𝛿12 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑗
+  𝛿13 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗 + 𝛿14 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝛿15 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝛿16 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗
+ 𝛿17 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛿18 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛿19 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛿20 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗
+ 𝛿21 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used to infer the significance of regression coefficients 
produced by estimating our OLS and logit regression models. 
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3.2.4. Debt-based Reputational Damage 
Following (Sturm, 2013a), we employ the cumulative abnormal CDS spread change (𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶) and 
cumulative abnormal CDS relative spread change (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶) to measure the change in the implied default 
risk of the loss firm caused by operational risk announcements. To the extent that operational losses are 
covered by the shareholders’ equity (i.e. only affect the expected cash flows received by the 
shareholders), operational risk events should not be relevant to the expected cash flows received by the 
creditors (Plunus et al., 2012). Hence, we argue that any positive impact on 𝐶𝐴(𝑅)𝑆𝐶 would indicate 
both an increase in the implied default risk of the loss firm and a pure reputational loss (i.e. debt-based 
reputational damage).  
We have chosen to employ CDS spreads rather than bond returns to measure the debt-based impact 
of operational risk announcements (i.e. which we consider as a proxy for both the pure reputational 
impact and change in implied default risk around the operational risk announcement). There are three 
reasons for our choice. First, Ericsson, Jacobs, & Oviedo, 2009 found that CDS spreads are superior to 
stock returns and bond returns in measuring the default risk of the business entity. Second, Mengle, 
2007 documented a boost in CDS market liquidity due to the increased contribution of hedge funds in 
more recent years. Third, Blanco et al., 2005 showed that the causality relationship flows from CDS 
spreads (the cause) to bond spreads (the effect) and not vice versa.  
Following Sturm, 2013a, we collect data on five year modified modified structure CDS spreads in 
Euros from DataStream and data on iTraxx index from Bloomberg. 
We compute cumulative abnormal CDS spread change (CASC) as follows: 
𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = (𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) − (𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡 − 𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡−1) 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(𝒕𝟏,𝒕𝟐) = ∑ 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑡
𝒕𝟐
𝒕=𝒕𝟏
 
Also, we compute cumulative abnormal CDS spread relative change (CARSC) as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = (
(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡−1)
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
) − (
(𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡 − 𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡−1)
𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡−1
) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(𝒕𝟏,𝒕𝟐) = ∑ 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑡
𝒕𝟐
𝒕=𝒕𝟏
 
Table 3 shows that the mean 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) is 5.58 basis point (p-value = 0.0001) and mean 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) is 2.13% (p-value = 0.0031). This initial result shows that our sample announcements 
cause a severe debt-based reputational damage in CDS markets, thus calling for further research to 
examine the determinants of such a damage.  
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Since operational risk announcements are known to directly hit the stock prices of loss firms but are 
only indirectly related to debt markets, we expect 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) to be an endogenous variable in the 
structural equation estimating the CDS market reactions to operational risk announcements. Differently 
speaking, we propose that the following instrumental variables: the equity analysts’ stock 
recommendation (Buy Stock Recommendation), annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns 
(StDev Stock Return), systematic risk (beta), percentage of outstanding shares available to ordinary 
shareholders (float percent), and natural logarithm of trading volume (Trading Volume) to affect 
𝐶𝐴(𝑅)𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) only through their impact on 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5). 
Hence, to examine the debt-based reputational impact of credit ratings around the announcement of 
an operational risk event 𝑖 incurred by the loss firm 𝑗 during the event window (−5, +5), we estimate 
the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) model: 
First-stage Regression is to estimate the endogenous variable 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5): 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5)
= 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗
+ 𝛽3 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽10 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 +  𝛽12 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑗
+ 𝛽13 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽14 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽15 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽16 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗
+ 𝛽17 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽18 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽19 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽20 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗
+ 𝛽21 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
Second-stage regression is to estimate 𝐶𝐴(𝑅)𝑆𝐶(−5, +5): 
𝐶𝐴(𝑅)𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑗(−5, +5)
= 𝜅𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾1 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗 + 𝛾2 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛾3 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛾4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾5 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛾6 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾7 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾8 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛾9 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾10 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 +  𝛾11 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑗
+ 𝛾12 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛾13 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛾14 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛾15 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗
+ 𝛾16 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝛾17 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5)̂ + 𝜐𝑖𝑗 
Where 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5)̂  is the estimated value of 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) from the first-stage regression. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standards errors are used to infer the significance of regression coefficients 
produced by estimating both stages of our 2SLS regression model.  
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3.2.5. Control Variables 
To properly identify our multivariate regression models, we include control variables that are 
commonly used in the market-based literature. To consider the information environment of the loss 
firm, we employ the number of analysts following the firm in the month preceding the announcement 
(Analyst Coverage). We collect data on analyst coverage from Bloomberg. Table 3 shows that at least 
one analyst has to be following the loss firm prior to the operational risk announcement in order to be 
included in our final sample. In Table 3, the mean (median) number of analysts following is 22(23) 
which reflects the adequate visibility that our sample firms enjoy, thus confirming the importance and 
relevance of expert advice to the equity and debt investors of these firms.  
We also control for the size, profitability, leverage and growth of the loss firm using the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Total Assets), return on assets (ROA), long-term debt to shareholders’ equity 
ratio (Leverage) and ratio of market value of equity to its book value (Market to Book Ratio), 
respectively. In addition to the accounting-based proxies, we control for the market-based performance 
of the loss firm. First, we control for the riskiness of the loss firm using market-based measures which 
are the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns (StDev Stock Return) and monthly betas 
(Beta). Second, we consider the share’s floatation by including the percentage of outstanding shares 
available to ordinary shareholders one week before the announcement date (Float). Third, we control 
for the trading volume by including the natural logarithm of the number of shares traded for the stock 
(in thousands) one week before the announcement date (Trading Volume). We collect accounting and 
market data from DataStream. Since we conduct a multi-country analysis, we control for the GDP per 
capita whose data is collected from the World Bank’s website (GDP Per Capita). Table 3 shows the 
wide range of values for the accounting-based, market-based and country-level variables, thus 
confirming the diversity of our final sample.  
Since the reputational impact of operational risk announcements could also be caused by the features 
of the operational risk event or characteristics of the announcement per se, we control for these factors 
in our empirical analysis. We collect data on event and announcement dummies by double-checking 
the contents of operational risk announcements in LexisNexis. First, we employ a dummy variable to 
capture whether the operational loss amount is disclosed or leaked in the event window (-5,+5) (Loss 
Disclosed Dum). Table 3 shows that 69% of our sample announcements have the operational loss 
amount disclosed during the event window (-5,+5). In addition, we control for whether the operational 
risk event has been recognized by the loss firm itself (Firm Recognized Dum). This does not necessarily 
mean that the loss firm has issued a press release, but this recognition could simply be mentioned in the 
first press-cutting (for example, a representative of the loss firm has made a short comment confirming 
the event but challenging the relevant fine imposed by a regulatory body or court of law).  
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Moreover, we include a dummy variable to indicate whether a simultaneous regulatory 
announcement concerning the operational risk event has been made (Regulatory Announced Dum). 
Almost always, operational risk announcements come out on the same trading day of the relevant 
regulatory announcement. Furthermore, a dummy variable is included to indicate whether the first 
announcement includes a final settlement (Settlement Dum). 16% of our final sample are final 
settlement announcements (Table 3). Furthermore, we control for the location of the operational risk 
event itself (not the announcement) and whether it has taken place in a different country from the loss 
firm’s incorporation country (Different Country Dum).  
Additionally, we consider whether the operational risk event has involved top corporate figures (i.e. 
board directors or one of the five highest paid executive officers of the loss firm) (Top Figures Dum). 
Moreover, since ORIC International employs additional “non-Basel II” business lines such as life 
insurance, general insurance and insurance broking, we include a dummy variable to control for the 
“Basel II” business lines which are: corporate finance, trading and sales, retail banking, commercial 
banking, payment and settlement, agency services, asset management and retail brokerage (Basel 
Business Line Dum). Table 3 shows that the majority of our final sample (78%) are events incurred in 
“Basel II” business lines. We also control for the fraudulent nature of the event by including a dummy 
variable to capture whether the operational risk event is classified as an internal fraud or external fraud 
(Fraud Dum). Table 3 shows that 13% of our final sample are either internal fraud or external fraud 
events. Finally, we control for the regional effects by adding a dummy variable for events incurred by 
U.S. firms (U.S. Firm Dum). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
4.1.1. Equity-based Reputational Effects of Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 
Table 4 (Panel A) reports the mean 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) and proportion of operational risk 
announcements causing an equity-based reputational damage (i.e. negative 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5))  for the 
“Buy” versus “Hold” stock recommendations and “Low Dispersion” versus “High Dispersion” stock 
recommendations in our final sample.  
 “Buy” firms are clearly associated with much lower reputational return (i.e. the difference is 1.79% 
and significant at the 10% level) and higher probability of reputational damage (i.e. the difference is 
approximately 14% and significant at the 5% level) than “Hold” firms. Subject to the conventional 
caveats of univariate analysis, this result initially indicates that equity investors are calmer around 
operational risk events incurred by “Hold” firms. One possible explanation is the long-term investment 
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strategies that are implied by “Hold” stock recommendation and are less sensitive to short-term 
idiosyncratic informational shocks. 
In addition to mean comparisons across median stock recommendation groups, we split our final 
sample into two groups according to the dispersion of most recent consensus stock recommendations. 
“Low Dispersion” group includes firms whose standard deviation of stock recommendations is lower 
than or equal to our sample’s median (i.e. 0.93), whilst “High Dispersion” group includes the remaining 
observations. 
“Low Dispersion” firms are clearly associated with much lower reputational return (i.e. the 
difference is 1.79% and significant at the 5% level) and higher probability of reputational damage (i.e. 
the difference is approximately 15% and significant at the 5% level) than “High Dispersion” firms. 
Again, our preliminary results suggest that equity investors revise their prior beliefs more 
aggressively and adversely when there is less ex ante heterogeneity in analyst’s stock recommendations. 
Differently speaking, the informational shock caused by operational risk announcements is amplified 
when it is less expected (i.e. when there is more agreement among analysts’ stock recommendations). 
Overall, considering the typical reservation of no controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in 
univariate analysis, the results in Table (4), Panel (A) lend support to the “Expectancy Violation” theory 
whereby more favorable and less heterogeneous stock recommendations constitute a reputational 
liability due to heightened expectations that are seriously challenged by the unexpected negative 
information about the loss firm released via operational risk announcements.   
 
4.1.2. Debt-based Reputational Effects of Credit Ratings 
Table 4 (Panel B) reports the mean 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) and mean 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) around operational 
risk announcements for the “Low Credit Rating” versus “High Credit Rating” groups and “Speculative 
Grade” versus “Investment Grade” groups in our final sample. 
The “Low Credit Rating” group includes firms whose five-year cumulate default probability is 
higher than or equal to our sample’s median (i.e. 0.69%), whilst the “High Credit Rating” group includes 
the remaining observations. 
The results strongly imply that lower credit ratings are reputationally damaging around operational 
risk announcements. First, on average, “Low Credit Rating” firms incur a higher 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) (i.e. 
the difference is 11 basis points and significant at the 1% level) and a higher 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) (i.e. the 
difference is 3.5% and significant at the 5% level) than “High Credit Rating” firms. Second, “SG” firms 
incur a higher 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) (i.e. the difference is 40 basis points and significant at the 1% level) and 
a higher 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) (i.e. the difference is 11.6% and significant at the 1% level) than “IG” firms. 
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Overall, the results in Table (4), Panel (B) strongly support the “Institutional Legitimacy” theory 
whereby higher credit ratings serve as a reputational asset that could make investors grant the loss firm 
the benefit of the doubt and hence penalize it less harshly, thus ultimately alleviating the debt-based 
reputational damage caused by operational risk announcements. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
4.2.1. Equity-based Reputational Effects of Analysts’ Stock Recommendations around 
Operational Risk Announcements 
Table 5 reports the effects of analysts’ stock recommendations and most recent credit ratings on the 
reputational cumulative abnormal return 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) and the log-odds of equity-based reputational 
damage 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑟 (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5,+5)<0)
Pr (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5,+5)≥0)
) around operational risk event announcements incurred by financial 
institutions. Model (1) shows that firms with “Buy” stock recommendation incur a more severe 
reputational damage than firms with “Hold” stock recommendation. The adverse reputational impact is 
statistically significant and economically strong; “Buy” firms lose around 2% in reputational return 
more than “Hold” firms. In the same Model (1), there is no significant impact of the number of analysts 
following the firm Analyst Coverage on 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5). This result implies that it is the favorability 
of analysts’ recommendations, rather than the intensity of analyst coverage per se, that drives the equity-
based reputational impact of unexpected bad news. In addition, Model (2) confirms the results in Model 
(1) by showing that “Buy” firms are more likely to incur an equity-based reputational damage (i.e. 
negative 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)) around operational risk announcements.  
It is interesting to note that once Credit Rating Level and Speculative Grade enter Models (3) and 
(5), respectively, the impact of Buy Stock Recommendation on 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) becomes much weaker 
and insignificant. Nevertheless, even after controlling for the credit rating effects in Models (4) and (6), 
“Buy” firms are still more likely than “Hold” firms to suffer an equity-based reputational damage 
around operational risk announcements. Taken together, the results of  Buy Stock Recommendation in 
Table (5) indicate that equity investors would revise their ex ante beliefs more aggressively for “Buy” 
firms than for “Hold” firms around operational risk announcements, thus increasing the likelihood of 
reputational damage for the earlier. However, considering the credit rating effects (which will be 
discussed later in this subsection), the extent of reputational damage for “Buy” firms might not be as 
severe as implied by the univariate results reported in Table (4), Panel (A). Overall, these results suggest 
that favorable stock recommendations constitute a reputational liability (i.e. a more favorite stock 
recommendation is associated with a more severe reputational damage) whereby unexpected bad news 
cause investors to revise downwardly their prior elevated expectations that have proved hard to be met. 
20 
 
Moreover, in Table (5), Panel (A), Credit Rating Level enters insignificant in Models (3) and (4). 
However, Speculative Grade enters negative but insignificant (coefficient of -0.031043) in Model (5) 
estimating 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) and enters positive and significant at the 5% level (coefficient of 1.800284) 
in Model (6) estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage. Hence, this result indicates 
that “SG” firms are more likely than “IG” firms to incur an equity-based reputational damage, but such 
a reputational damage might not be severe enough to warrant a significantly negative coefficient on  
Speculative Grade in Model (5). Overall, these results reflect that credit ratings act as a reputational 
asset whereby investors give “IG” firms the benefit of the doubt and hence penalize them less 
aggressively than “SG” firms once unanticipated adverse news hits the equity markets.  
It is however crucial to note that the equity-based reputational results in Table (5) imply that stock 
recommendations constitute a reputational liability, whilst credit ratings serve as a reputational asset 
around operational risk announcements. There could be a number of explanations for this finding. First, 
by nature, credit ratings have a longer future horizon and are less volatile and less heterogeneous than 
stock recommendations. Second, credit ratings are institutionally issued and updated by fewer 
agencies11, whilst stock recommendations are developed and revised by a bigger number of individual 
analysts12 some of whom might have been following the respective firm for a very short time, lack 
sufficient industry-specific expertise, or miss access to costly private information. Third, in some 
countries, increased regulation of equity research could give credit rating agencies an informational 
advantage by accessing private information that is not freely available to equity analysts. For example, 
Regulation Fair Disclosure in the U.S., prohibiting the selective nonpublic disclosure to equity analysts 
but allowing it to credit rating agencies, was found to substantially increase the informational content 
of credit rating updates (Jorion, Liu, & Shi, 2005). Taking the three reasons together, it could be viable 
to believe that credit ratings are more “institutionally legitimate” than stock recommendations. In other 
words, less informed investors and liquidity traders show credit ratings as providing more stable and 
consistent information than stock recommendations about the future economic performance and risk 
profile of the respective firm. Hence, the idiosyncratic informational shocks cause equity investors to 
revise their ex ante beliefs formed by stock recommendations more frequently and more aggressively 
than they do for credit ratings. 
                                                          
11 It is noteworthy that our empirical analysis covers the post global financial crisis period (post-GFC) during and immediately 
after which several credit rating agencies were heavily criticized by practitioners and academics, and fined by regulators and 
supervisors for their practices regarding inaccurate and upwardly biased credit ratings of financial institutions and instruments 
(Griffin & Tang, 2011, 2012). Therefore, it can be expected that post-GFC (i.e. during our sample period) credit rating agencies 
have become more careful in issuing and updating their rating decisions, especially for financial institutions and instruments 
that were at the core of the harsh criticism. 
12 We realize that most of equity analysts work for brokerage houses but it is also well-established in the literature that 
individual analyst’s characteristics, such as future career concerns (Horton, Serafeim, & Wu, 2017)  and behavioral bias 
(Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler, & Agarwal, 2009), might create an incremental bias in their stock recommendations and 
earnings forecasts. 
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The results in Table (5), Panel (B) show that StDev Stock Recommendation has no clear reputational 
impact around operational risk announcements. This indicates that investors revise their prior beliefs 
based on the median, rather than the dispersion, of stock recommendations. However, the results for 
Credit Rating Level and Speculative Grade resemble those reported in Table (5), Panel (A).  
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
4.2.2. Debt-based Reputational Effects of Credit Ratings around Operational Risk 
Announcements 
Since equity markets and CDS markets could react simultaneously to operational risk 
announcements, we consider this possible endogeneity when identifying our multivariate models for 
the debt-based reputational damage around operational risk announcements. Our main assumption here 
is that equity markets would react faster than CDS markets to operational risk announcements. This is 
because operational risk events and related losses are expected to directly hit the equity capital of a loss 
firm, whereas they will only indirectly impact on the long-term creditworthiness of the loss firm. 
Therefore, we treat 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) as an endogenous variable in the models identifying the debt-based 
reputational effects of credit ratings around operational risk announcements. 
Table 6 reports the results on the debt-based reputational effects of credit rating levels and “SG” 
ratings around operational risk announcements in financial institutions. Due to limited CDS data 
availability, the debt-based sample (135 observations) is obviously much smaller than the equity-based 
sample (255 observations), whose results are reported in Table 5. However, our debt-based sample is 
still bigger than the samples used in Sturm, 2013a and Plunus et al., 2012 who also studied the impact 
of operational risk announcements in debt (CDS and bonds) markets although they have covered longer 
sample periods in their respective studies. 
Firstly, starting with Table 6 (panel A), the endogeneity (Stock-Write) test (i.e. test values range 
from 3.27 with p-value of 0.6578 in Model (2) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) to 3.39 with p-value of 0.6404 
in Model (3) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5)) fails to reject the null hypothesis that 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) is an 
endogenous variable in the structural equation identified. Hence, after passing the endogeneity test, we 
move on to test the validity of the instrumental variables chosen. As discussed in Section 3.2.4., we 
have employed five instrumental variables which are the “Buy” stock recommendation (Buy Stock 
Recommendation), annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns (StDev Stock Return), 
systematic risk (beta), the percentage of outstanding shares available to ordinary shareholders (float 
percent), and the natural logarithm of the stock’s trading volume (Trading Volume). The F-test of 
excluded instruments (i.e. test value is 2.60 and p-value is 0.029) rejects the null hypothesis that those 
instrumental variables can jointly be excluded from the first-stage regression (i.e. the regression 
estimating 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)). Hence, we deduce that the instrumental variables employed are strictly 
exogenous to the second-stage regression.  
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To confirm the validity of our group of instrumental variables, the overidentification (Sargan) test 
(i.e. test values range from 0.925 with p-value of 0.9209 in Model (2) to 1.910 with p-value of 0.7524 
in Model (3)) fails to reject the null hypothesis that the structural equation is not over-identified meaning 
that there are no redundant instruments. Regarding the strength of the instrumental variables selected 
(i.e. their joint explanation power of 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)), the partial R-squared of excluded instruments is 
0.0987 indicating that variations in our instrumental variables explain, on average, around 9.87% of 
variations in 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)). Although this is not a high R-squared value, considering previous papers 
using 2SLS regression models (for example, Laeven & Levine, 2009), it would still indicate that our 
chosen instruments are not weak. 
Regarding the second-stage regression, the coefficients of Credit Rating Level enter statistically 
significant and economically powerful. For Model (2) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5), the coefficient of 
Credit Rating Level is 10.07 (p-value < 0.01). This is a big economic magnitude; for example, a credit 
rating downgrade from AA- to A+ in 2014 (i.e. amounting to 0.14% increase in the five-year cumulative 
default probability; see Appendix B) would increase 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by 1.41 basis point. However, the 
economic impact would be much more severe if the downgrade is across lower credit ratings. For 
example, a credit rating downgrade from BB- to B+ in 2014 (i.e. amounting to 5.72% increase in the 
five-year cumulative default probability; see Appendix B) would increase 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by 57.60 
basis point (approximately, 40 times bigger than the increase in 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) following the AA- to 
A+ downgrade).  
The results in Model (3) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) confirm the findings in Model (2). The 
coefficient of Credit Rating Level is 0.0367 (p-value < 0.01). Again, the economic magnitude is 
economically strong since a one-point downgrade from AA- to A+ and from BB- to B+ in 2014 would 
cause an increase in 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by 0.51% and 21%, respectively. 
The results in Table (6), Panel (B) support the findings inferred from Table (6), Panel (A). In 
summary, “SG” firms incur a more severe debt-based reputational damage than “IG” firms around 
operational risk announcements. More specifically, on average, an “SG” firm would incur 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5)) that is higher by 41.08 basis point (15.34%) than “IG” firms.  These 
results are qualitatively similar to the mean differences reported in Table (4), Panel (B); again, 
confirming our inferences about the reputational shields created by higher credit ratings. 
Taken together, the results in Table (6) imply two main findings. First, credit ratings serve as a 
reputational asset that effectively mitigates the adverse debt-based reputational consequences of 
operational risk announcements. Second, the debt-based reputational effects of credit ratings around 
operational risk announcements are non-linear (i.e. a one-point credit rating downgrade could seriously 
be more damaging; both economically and reputationally, if it happens at the lower “SG” ratings). 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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5. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
5.1. U.S. Firms 
Most of previous studies on the reputational effects of operational risk announcements have been 
performed in an international context (for example, Fiordelisi et al., 2013; Perry & Fontnouvelle, 2005; 
Plunus et al., 2012)). In Addition, Gillet et al. (2010) have compared US and European subsamples and 
found that the reputational damage occurs only in US firms possibly due to their higher market values 
which lower the magnitude of the mechanical market reaction to the operational risk announcement (i.e. 
the operational loss amount divided by the loss firm’s market value). On the contrary, Fiordelisi et al. 
(2014) found that the reputational losses are more severe in European firms. Given this mixed evidence 
in the literature, we want to find out whether our empirical results differ across regions. Hence, we 
interact U.S. Firm Dum with our four measures of expert advice13.  
The results, reported in Table (7), Panel (A)14, show that all our empirical results are not different 
across regions, except for the standard deviation of stock recommendations; the variable of interest is 
the interaction term StDev * U.S. Firm. In Model (3) estimating 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5), StDev * U.S. Firm 
enters negative (-0.218457) and significant at the 5% level. It indicates that more heterogeneity in 
analysts’ stock recommendations would trigger a reputational damage only if the operational risk event 
is incurred by a U.S. firm. However, it is noteworthy that StDev Stock Recommendation has a 
significantly positive coefficient (0.127155). Moreover, the results reported in Model (4) estimating the 
log-odds of equity-based reputational damage confirm the findings from Model (3).  
Thus, adhering to the “Expectancy Violation” theory, less heterogeneous stock recommendations 
would constitute a reputational liability around operational risk announcements only in non-U.S. firms. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that, in our sample, StDev Stock Recommendation is, on 
average, significantly higher in non-U.S. firms (0.95) than U.S. firms (0.83); hence, equity investors 
would view stock recommendations of non-U.S. firms to be less stable (i.e. less legitimate) and more 
aggressively challenge them around sizable informational shocks. 
                                                          
13 In unreported further analysis, we attempted other geographical regions and countries such as United Kingdom and Japan, 
but we did not find any significant differences for our four measures of expert advice. 
14 For the sake of brevity, only the variables of interest are reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
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5.2. Fraud Incidents 
13% of our sample are fraud events (i.e. internal fraud or external fraud)15. Previous studies have 
documented strong adverse reputational consequences of fraud events in financial institutions. For 
example, Perry and Fontnouvelle (2005) documented a drop in the market value by more than double 
the operational loss ratio for internal fraud announcements. However, Fiordelisi et al. (2014) have found 
that external fraud announcements cause the most severe reputational damage. Other studies such as 
Sturm (2013b) and Fiordelisi et al. (2013) have not located a conclusive evidence regarding the 
reputational effects of operational risk event types. Given this mixed evidence in the literature, we are 
interested in examining how event types might be driving our empirical results. Hence, we interact 
Fraud Dum with our four measures of expert advice16. 
The results, reported in Table (7), Panel (B), show that only our debt-based inferences are effected 
by fraud incidence. In Model (5) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5), the interaction term Credit Rating Level * 
Fraud enters positive and significant at the 5% level (the coefficient is 2.15). This result indicates that 
credit ratings play a more important role as a reputational shield when a fraud event is announced. For 
example, a one-point upgrade from B+ to BB- in 2014 (i.e. amounting to 5.72% decrease in the five-
year cumulative default probability; see Appendix B) would decrease 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by an increment 
of 12.3 basis point for fraud events. Model (7), also estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5), confirm the inferences 
above; “SG” firms suffer an additional increase in 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) amounting to 7.86 basis points for 
fraud events. However, the interaction terms Credit Rating Level * Fraud and Speculative Grade * 
Fraud enter economically powerful but statistically insignificant in Models (6) and (8) estimating 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5). 
Overall, we interpret these results as supporting the “Institutional Legitimacy” theory for credit 
ratings. Since fraud events usually raise more serious suspicions about the integrity of senior 
management and other employees of the loss firm (in the case of internal fraud) and the effectiveness 
of preventive and detective internal controls (in the case of external fraud), the “institutional” and 
“legitimate” credit ratings should be more instrumental in cooling down investors’ frustrations and 
mitigating the debt-based reputational damage caused by operational risk announcements involving 
fraud allegations. 
                                                          
15 There are six event types in our final sample whose counts are: Internal Fraud (13), External Fraud (19), Clients, Products 
and Business Practices (212), Execution, Delivery and Process Management (4), Employment Practices and Workplace Safety 
(4), Business Disruption and System Failures (3). 
16 In unreported further analysis, we examined the interaction effects of other event types such as Internal Fraud (separately), 
External Fraud(separately), Clients, Products, and Business Practices and Executive, Delivery, and Process Management, but 
we did not find any significant differences for our four measures of expert advice. 
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5.3. Basel Business Lines 
Few previous studies on operational risk have focused on business lines as classified by Basel II 
(BCBS, 2006). One possible reason is the absence of clear theory to distinguish between different 
business lines as this classification seems to be driven mainly by practical implications rather than 
theoretical justifications. In an international sample, Fiordelisi et al. (2014) have found that “Trading 
and Sales’’ and ‘‘Payment and Settlement” events incur the most severe reputational damage. To put 
more robust theoretical reasoning behind this bit of further analysis, we distinguish between the eight 
Basel business lines as one group (i.e. Basel Business Line Dum = 1) and other non-Basel business lines 
used in ORIC (i.e. Basel Business Line Dum = 0)17. It is noteworthy that most non-Basel business lines 
(we call it ORIC business lines) are available in non-banking firms. Hence, Basel Business Line Dum 
mostly captures the bank-specific business models.18 
The results, reported in Table (7), Panel (C), show that credit ratings are more crucial in protecting 
from the debt-based reputational damage incurred by operational risk announcements in non-Basel 
business lines (i.e. non-banking activities). In Model (5) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5), the interaction term 
Credit Rating Level * Basel enters negative (-2.27) and significant at the 5% level. For example, a one-
point upgrade from B+ to BB- in 2014 (i.e. amounting to 5.72% decrease in the five-year cumulative 
default probability; see Appendix B) would decrease 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by an increment of 13 basis point 
for non-Basel business lines. Also, in Model (7) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5), the interaction term 
Speculative Grade * Basel enters negative (-8.84) and significant at the 5% level. This result indicates 
that, on average, transiting from the “SG” category to the “IG” category would decrease 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) 
by an increment of 8.84 basis point for non-Basel business lines. The results in Models (6) and (8) 
estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) confirm the findings above. 
One possible explanation for this result is that, compared with non-banks (i.e. non-Basel business 
lines), there is more regulated operational risk management and disclosure (e.g. robust methods of 
quantifying and reporting the operational risk regulatory capital) and stronger investor protection (e.g. 
deposit guarantees) in banks (i.e. Basel business lines), thus downplaying the importance of credit 
ratings as soft reputational shields. 
                                                          
17 There are fourteen business lines in our final sample whose counts are: Agency Services (13), Asset Management (5), 
Commercial Banking (14), Corporate Finance (14), Corporate Services (32), Financial Exchanges (3), General Insurance (4), 
Insurance Broking (4), Life Assurance (5), Payments and Settlement (6), Wealth Management (7), Retail Banking (77), Retail 
Brokerage (10), Trading and Sales (61). 
18 In unreported further analysis, we substitute Basel Business Line Dum with another dummy variable that equals 1 if the loss 
firm is a bank and 0 otherwise. The results remain qualitatively similar; thus, confirming our conjecture about the differences 
between Basel business lines and ORIC business lines. 
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5.4. Top Figures  
Several studies have documented a firm-level and manager-level reputational damage following 
adverse news announcements such as fraud allegations and financial statement restatements involving 
senior management (for example, Chakravarthy, De Haan, & Rajgopal, 2014; Desai, Hogan, & Wilkins, 
2006; Fich & Shivdasani, 2007). Hence, we want to find out whether our empirical results are sensitive 
to operational risk announcements including top figures in the loss firm. By top figures we mean any 
board director or one of the five highest paid executives affiliated with the loss firm at the time of the 
announcement. The announcement needs to explicitly mention that the top figure is directly responsible 
for the operational risk event. Applying these criteria, only 8% of our sample events are associated with 
a top figure. 
Our results, reported in Table (7), Panel (D), indicate that equity investors revise their prior beliefs 
more aggressively for less heterogeneous stock recommendations when the bad news involves a top 
figure. The consequences could be disastrous to the loss firm since, according to Model (3) estimating 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5), a one-point decrease in StDev Stock Recommendation (i.e. less heterogeneity) would 
cause 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) to drop by an increment of 41.5% when the operational risk event is committed 
by a top figure. The results in Model (4) estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 
confirm the findings above. 
Collectively, this result implies that announcing a misconduct of senior management in less risky 
firms (i.e. where analysts disagree less about its stock recommendation) causes an extremely serious 
downward correction of investors’ ex ante expectations about the firm’s future economic profile; thus, 
demolishing its reputation and, possibly, raising a going-concern red flag.19 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
6.1. Settlement Loss Amount as a Correction for All Events 
As explained in Section 3.2.3., to compute 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5), we utilized the ratio of the actual 
disclosed loss amount to the loss firm’s market value in order to partial out the mechanical market 
reaction included in 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5). Two reservations can be made about using the actual disclosed loss 
amount. First, the loss amount to market value adjustment would be forced to be zero in all 
announcements where the loss amount is unknown at the announcement date; hence, possibly, 
downwardly biasing our equity-based reputational measure 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5). Second, according to 
Gillet et al. (2010), market participants can unbiasedly estimate the future loss amount. Hence, as a 
                                                          
19 In unreported further analysis, we interacted our four measures of expert advice with other event and announcement 
characteristics which are: Loss Disclosed Dum, Firm Recognized Dum, Regulatory Announced Dum, Settlement Dum, and 
Different Country Dum, but we could not find significant or consistent results for the interaction terms. 
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robustness check, we use the ex post (settlement) loss amount as a correction for all events in our final 
sample.20 
The results reported in Table (8), Panel (A) are rerun replications of the regressions in Tables (5) 
and (6) using the alternative measure of 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5). For the sake of brevity, only the coefficients 
of our four measures of expert advice are reported. Clearly, the results in all eight models strongly 
coincide with the findings in our main regressions; thus, confirming that the inferences drawn are not 
affected by any possible bias in our equity-based reputational measure.21 
6.2.  Time Elapsed Since Last Credit Rating Update 
Another reservation that can be made about our results is that there could be a considerable lag 
period between the operational risk event and preceding credit rating update; thus, possibly diluting any 
reputational effects of credit ratings due to new information injected into the markets during this lag 
period. Hence, as a robustness check, we introduce the variable Lag which is the number of days since 
the most recent credit rating update22. The variables of interest are Credit Rating Level * Lag and 
Speculative Grade * Lag. 
The results, reported in Table (8), Panel (B), show that the equity-based reputational effects of credit 
ratings weaken as more time elapses. In Model (1) estimating 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5), Credit Rating Level 
enters negative (-0.009077) and significant at the 1% level, whilst the interaction term Credit Rating 
Level * Lag enters positive (0.000012) and significant at the 5% level. This result implies the 
contribution of credit ratings as an equity-based reputational shield deteriorates by time and that credit 
ratings, in the long term, become an equity-based reputational liability. In other words, the more time 
is elapsed since most recent credit rating, the more aggressively equity investors would revise their prior 
beliefs around operational risk announcements in firms with higher credit ratings. The results in Models 
(2), (3), and (4) confirm the findings above for the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage and 
“IG” firms. Our results coincide with Wade et al. (2006) who found that CEO certifications gained from 
Financial World’s contest cause short-term positive abnormal returns but impose a long-term adverse 
impact on the firm’s market performance. 
To clarify the economic magnitude and implication of this result, we give the following example. 
The turnaround point (i.e. the point of time at which credit ratings become a reputational liability rather 
than a reputational asset), suggested my Model (1), is 756 days which correspond to approximately 66% 
                                                          
20 The average (median) settlement loss is USD 301 (73) million and its minimum (maximum) is USD 1.19 (6,108) million. 
Its standard deviation is USD 686 million. 
21 In unreported robustness checks, we reran all our main regressions for different shorter event windows such as (-1,+1), (-
3,+3), (0,+3), (0,+5) and found qualitatively similar results though little weaker for very short event windows such (-1,+1) and 
post-event windows such as (0,+3). This implies that the reputational effects of expert advice need longer time to materialize 
and extend to influence investors’ behaviour in the pre-event windows when private and uncertain information about the 
operational risk event might have leaked into the markets. 
22 The average (median) Lag is 525 (639) days and its minimum (maximum) is 38 (2088) days. Its standard deviation is 425 
days. 
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of our sample. Now, let us assume that two identical operational risk events are incurred by two firms, 
(A) and (B), on the same day in 2014. Both firms have the same credit rating BBB+; however, the only 
difference is that the lag since most recent credit rating is 100 days for firm (A) and 900 days for firm 
(B). Hence, according to Model (1), if both firms were rated one-point higher (for example, A- rather 
than BBB+; corresponding to a reduction of 0.58% in the five-year cumulative default probability; see 
Appendix (B)), this would increase 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) by 0.46% in firm (A), but decrease it by 0.10% in 
firm (B). Hence, higher credit ratings would serve as an equity-based reputational asset in firm (A) and 
an equity-based reputational liability in firm (B). 
It is however noteworthy that, unlike the equity-based results discussed above, the time elapsed does 
not dilute the debt-based reputational effects of credit ratings. In Models (5), (6), (7), and (8), both 
interaction terms Credit Rating Level * Lag and Speculative Grade * Lag enter insignificant. This 
indicates that, regardless of the lag, higher credit ratings would persistently serve as a debt-based 
reputational shield around operational risk announcements. One possible explanation for the differences 
between the equity-based and debt-based reputational results is that equity-based investors of publicly 
listed firms are protected from the corporate bankruptcy consequences by the “Shareholder’s Limited 
Liability” harbor and therefore tend to revise the reputational implications of credit ratings over time. 
On the contrary, debt investors view credit ratings as a direct measure of the firm’s default risk and an 
indirect measure of its reputation and therefore are less likely to revise their prior beliefs only because 
of elapsed time. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on a sample of 255 operational risk event announcements from 81 financial institutions 
publicly listed in 20 countries which hit the public media news during the post-global financial crisis 
years 2010 – 2014, our empirical results strongly support the proposition that stock recommendations 
and credit ratings drive the reputational effects caused by the unexpected arrival of bad news into 
financial markets. However, the persistence and magnitude of such reputational effects differ according 
to several factors. 
Generally speaking, stock recommendations represent a reputational liability, whilst credit ratings 
serve as a reputational asset around operational risk announcements in financial institutions. More 
specifically, “Buy” stocks and “SG” firms are more likely to incur an equity-based reputational damage. 
Moreover, firms with lower credit ratings incur a much more severe debt-based reputational damage.  
Additionally, we performed a further analysis to find out whether the reputational effects of expert 
advice are moderated by event characteristics. A number of interesting inferences are drawn. First, 
equity investors revise their prior beliefs more aggressively in non-US firms with less heterogeneous 
stock recommendations. Second, credit ratings are more instrumental in mitigating the debt-based 
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reputational damage caused by fraud incidents or incurred in non-Basel business lines (i.e. non-banking 
activities). Third, the misconduct of senior management could demolish the reputation of firms with 
less heterogeneous stock recommendations. 
Finally, our robustness checks reveal two additional findings. First, our main empirical results are 
robust to the usage of settlement loss as a correction in computing our equity-based reputational 
measure. Second, credit ratings serve as an equity-based reputational asset in the short term but turn 
into a reputational liability in the long term.  
All in all, our paper covers the most common source of reputational risk in the financial industry; 
that is operational risk announcements. However, further research could be done to examine the 
reputational effects of expert advice for other reputation damaging events in financial and non-financial 
firms, such as money laundry cases, product recalls, downsizings and layoffs. Moreover, future studies 
could investigate whether credit-related operational risk event announcements might cause a debt-based 
reputational damage which is more severe than the resulting equity-based reputational damage. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection Procedure 
This table reports the selection criteria and procedure of our final sample comprising operational risk event announcements in publicly listed 
financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 
– 2014). 
Sample Selection Procedure Observations 
Complete ORIC Database (March 2015) 16110 
(-) Announcements before 1st January 2010 (804) 
(-) Announcements after 31st December 2014 (99) 
(-) Announcements in non-financial Firms (2190) 
(-) Announcements in loss firms not headquartered in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan (3101) 
(-) Announcements which have no clear operational risk classification (event type or business line) (5362) 
(-) Announcements whose dates are not confirmed or full-text press articles not found (3396) 
(-) Announcements in private financial firms (785) 
(-) Announcements overlapping with earnings announcements or credit rating announcements (two trading 
weeks before and after the operational risk announcement) 
(98) 
(-) Announcements with “Underperform” stock recommendation (2) 
(-) Announcements in loss firms with incomplete DataStream and Bloomberg data  (18) 
Final Sample 255 
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Table 2: Composition of the Final Sample 
This table reports the composition of our final sample comprising operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). 
Panel A: By Country 
Country Frequency Percent% 
Australia 13 5.1 
Austria 2 0.78 
Belgium 1 0.39 
Canada 2 0.78 
France 3 1.18 
Germany 14 5.49 
Hungary 2 0.78 
Ireland 1 0.39 
Israel 1 0.39 
Italy 1 0.39 
Japan 30 11.76 
Netherlands 3 1.18 
Norway 1 0.39 
Russian Federation 2 0.78 
Spain 2 0.78 
Sweden 2 0.78 
Switzerland 18 7.06 
Turkey 6 2.35 
United Kingdom 69 27.06 
United States 82 32.16 
Total 255 100 
 
 
  
37 
 
Table 2: Composition of the Final Sample 
This table reports the composition of our final sample comprising operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014).  
Panel B: By Industry Type 
Industry Type Frequency Percent% 
Banks 55 21.57 
Consumer Finance 3 1.18 
Corporate Banking 1 0.39 
Diversified Banks 117 45.88 
Institutional Brokerage 19 7.45 
Institutional Trust, Fiduciary & Custody 5 1.96 
Insurance Brokers 1 0.39 
Investment Income - Life Insurance 1 0.39 
Investment Management 3 1.18 
Life Insurance 7 2.75 
Mortgage Finance 3 1.18 
Other Financial Services 2 0.78 
P&C Insurance 6 2.35 
Retail Banking 14 5.49 
Trading & Principal Investment 4 1.57 
Wealth Management 14 5.49 
Total 255 100 
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Table 2: Composition of the Final Sample 
This table reports the composition of our final sample comprising operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). 
Panel C: By Stock Recommendation 
Stock Recommendation Frequency Percent% 
Buy 108 42.35 
Hold 147 57.65 
Total 255 100 
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Table 2: Composition of the Final Sample 
This table reports the composition of our final sample comprising operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). 
Panel D: By Credit Rating 
Credit Rating Grade Credit Rating Level Frequency Percent% 
Investment Grade 
AA 5 2.24 
AA- 10 4.48 
A+ 36 16.14 
A 43 19.28 
A- 76 34.08 
BBB+ 18 8.07 
BBB 9 4.04 
Speculative Grade 
BB+ 11 4.93 
BB 7 3.14 
B- 8 3.59 
 Total 223 100 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables tested. Variables description is reported in the appendix. 
Variables Obs Min Median Mean StDev Max 
RCAR(-5,+5) 255 -0.2174 -0.0024 0.0082 0.0695 0.5334 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0) 255 0 1 0.5137 0.5008 1 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) 135 -31 1.78 5.58 16.3 40.51 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) 135 -0.2178 0.0253 0.0213 0.082 0.218 
Buy Stock Recommendation 255 0 0 0.42 0.5 1 
StDev Stock Recommendation 255 0 0.93 0.91 0.2 1.41 
Credit Rating Level 223 0.25 0.69 1.69 3.81 28.76 
Speculative Grade 223 0 0 0.12 0.32 1 
Analyst Coverage 255 1 23 21.57 8.55 37 
Loss Disclosed Dum 255 0 1 0.69 0.46 1 
Firm Recognized Dum 255 0 0 0.33 0.47 1 
Regulatory Announced Dum 255 0 1 0.56 0.50 1 
Settlement Dum 255 0 0 0.16 0.37 1 
Different Country Dum 255 0 0 0.26 0.44 1 
Top Figures Dum 255 0 0 0.08 0.27 1 
Basel Business Line Dum 255 0 1 0.78 0.41 1 
Fraud Dum 255 0 0 0.13 0.35 1 
U.S. Firm Dum 255 0 0 0.32 0.48 1 
StDev Stock Return 255 0.0084 0.0202 0.0223 0.0103 0.0766 
Beta 255 0.26 1.72 1.80 0.71 4.46 
Float 255 0 92 78.03 27.60 100 
Trading Volume 255 25 11732 25431 46980 333408 
Total Assets 255 756 1079727 1189585 906101 2867222 
ROA 255 -3.59 0.37 0.37 1.08 7.2 
Leverage 255 0 1.5 1.65 1.05 5.46 
Market to Book Ratio 255 0.32 0.9 1.04 0.69 4.79 
GDP Per Capita 255 10646 48374 49157 14009 100575 
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Table 4: Univariate Analysis 
This table reports the mean comparison tests of the severity and probability of reputational damage around operational risk announcements in financial 
institutions for different types of analysts’ stock recommendations and credit ratings. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Panel A: Equity-based Reputational Effects of Stock Recommendations 
 Buy Hold Difference 
Low 
Dispersion 
High 
Dispersion 
Difference 
Mean 𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) -0.0000373 0.0178959 -0.0179332 -0.0013943 0.0164647 -0.0178591 
   (-1.9154)*   (-2.0581)** 
       
Probability of Reputational Damage 0.5555556 0.4140625 0.1414931 0.5932203 0.4452555 0.1479649 
   (2.1804)**   (2.3739)** 
Observations 108 147  137 118  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: Univariate Analysis 
This table reports the mean comparison tests of the severity and probability of reputational damage around operational risk announcements in financial 
institutions for different types of analysts’ stock recommendations, credit rating levels and credit rating changes. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Panel B: Debt-based Reputational Effects of Credit Ratings 
 Low Credit 
Rating 
High Credit 
Rating 
Difference 
Speculative 
Grade 
Investment 
Grade 
Difference 
Mean 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 10.46766 -0.5404946 11.00815 40.5132 0.2000611 40.31314 
   (4.1257)***   (18.1377)*** 
       
Mean 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓 0.0368617 0.0018096 0.0350521 0.121783 0.0058214 0.1159616 
   (2.5178)**   (6.3567)*** 
Observations 75 60  18 117  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 5: Equity-based Reputational Effects of Analysts’ Stock Recommendations around Operational 
Risk Announcements 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1), (3) and (5) and the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational 
damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0))in Models (2), (4) and (6) around operational risk event announcements 
in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-
global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported in the appendix. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the regression 
coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Panel A: Buy Stock Recommendation 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.020017 0.656676 -0.011373 0.836043 -0.011436 0.839954 
 (2.28)** (2.13)** (1.05) (2.25)** (1.06) (2.26)** 
Credit Rating Level   -0.000680 -0.005610   
   (0.31) (0.12)   
Speculative Grade     -0.031043 1.800284 
     (1.45) (1.98)** 
Analyst Coverage 0.000519 -0.024317 0.001244 -0.017390 0.001254 -0.015909 
 (0.66) (0.93) (1.21) (0.57) (1.21) (0.52) 
Loss Disclosed Dum 0.001180 0.542829 0.005804 0.543956 0.008166 0.426968 
 (0.14) (1.66)* (0.70) (1.50) (0.93) (1.17) 
Firm Recognized Dum -0.012752 0.006993 -0.015456 0.061312 -0.018727 0.276249 
 (0.93) (0.02) (1.10) (0.14) (1.29) (0.60) 
Regulatory Announced Dum -0.010159 0.186968 -0.008086 0.227981 -0.006249 0.130291 
 (0.99) (0.64) (0.76) (0.70) (0.59) (0.39) 
Settlement Dum 0.010851 -0.684883 0.011722 -0.919533 0.011221 -0.911095 
 (0.86) (1.40) (0.86) (1.72)* (0.83) (1.70)* 
Different Country Dum -0.003345 0.006814 0.001843 -0.217523 -0.000777 -0.076840 
 (0.31) (0.02) (0.15) (0.50) (0.06) (0.18) 
Top Figures Dum -0.008715 -0.757437 0.003045 -1.006443 0.002361 -1.064053 
 (0.22) (1.26) (0.06) (1.42) (0.05) (1.52) 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.011693 0.171760 -0.011375 0.096965 -0.008371 -0.068955 
 (0.86) (0.48) (0.71) (0.24) (0.53) (0.17) 
Fraud Dum -0.001103 0.134262 0.007625 -0.180510 0.006123 -0.175547 
 (0.08) (0.27) (0.57) (0.33) (0.42) (0.32) 
U.S. Firm Dum 0.000027 -0.046011 0.008240 -0.348368 0.005435 -0.210784 
 (0.00) (0.11) (0.61) (0.73) (0.39) (0.43) 
StDev Stock Return 1.110933 -1.491603 0.667923 5.559275 0.821027 -1.060144 
 (1.72)* (0.09) (0.93) (0.30) (1.08) (0.05) 
Beta 0.011041 -0.360671 0.009407 -0.491178 0.011429 -0.640884 
 (1.48) (1.25) (0.88) (1.45) (1.13) (1.85)* 
Float -0.000155 0.002542 -0.000396 -0.003264 -0.000390 -0.002717 
 (0.75) (0.42) (0.97) (0.33) (0.97) (0.26) 
Ln(Trading Volume) -0.001976 0.067012 -0.000420 0.060984 -0.000314 0.060811 
 (0.50) (0.72) (0.09) (0.57) (0.06) (0.56) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.010129 -0.159188 0.007427 -0.289909 0.004159 -0.051396 
 (1.84)* (1.01) (1.01) (1.41) (0.58) (0.22) 
ROA 0.013355 -0.284136 0.002780 -0.078834 0.001125 0.001656 
 (2.27)** (1.38) (0.32) (0.30) (0.15) (0.00) 
Leverage 0.002556 -0.078426 0.003821 -0.161643 0.003076 -0.127398 
 (0.37) (0.47) (0.53) (0.87) (0.43) (0.71) 
Market to Book Ratio 0.006525 -0.037017 0.011467 -0.091870 0.010677 -0.000627 
 (0.82) (0.13) (1.01) (0.28) (1.03) (0.00) 
GDP Per Capita 0.000000 0.000006 0.000000 0.000025 0.000000 0.000028 
 (0.20) (0.50) (0.43) (1.33) (0.41) (1.36) 
Constant -0.145988 1.812196 -0.135531 3.537047 -0.096146 0.275789 
 (2.16)** (0.94) (1.47) (1.31) (1.10) (0.10) 
R2 0.12 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.09 
N 255 255 223 223 223 223 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Table 5: Equity-based Reputational Effects of Analysts’ Stock Recommendations around Operational 
Risk Announcements 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1), (3) and (5) and the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational 
damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0))in Models (2), (4) and (6) around operational risk event announcements 
in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-
global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported in the appendix. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the regression 
coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Panel B: Dispersion of Stock Recommendations 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
StDev Stock Recommendation -0.001452 -0.081644 0.057677 -1.244970 0.046051 -0.234821 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.97) (0.97) (0.73) (0.18) 
Credit Rating Level   0.000165 -0.026859   
   (0.09) (0.55)   
Speculative Grade     -0.021625 1.746896 
     (1.00) (1.75)* 
Analyst Coverage 0.000501 -0.022512 0.000962 -0.009002 0.001003 -0.012038 
 (0.71) (0.88) (1.11) (0.31) (1.16) (0.40) 
Loss Disclosed Dum 0.002893 0.473590 0.009008 0.434279 0.010057 0.365807 
 (0.34) (1.46) (1.00) (1.20) (1.09) (1.02) 
Firm Recognized Dum -0.015348 0.067976 -0.013210 0.019073 -0.016441 0.270369 
 (1.11) (0.16) (0.96) (0.04) (1.15) (0.59) 
Regulatory Announced Dum -0.011823 0.236191 -0.005910 0.251997 -0.005419 0.224098 
 (1.19) (0.80) (0.61) (0.76) (0.55) (0.68) 
Settlement Dum 0.011362 -0.671250 0.009251 -0.855333 0.009523 -0.886649 
 (0.88) (1.37) (0.67) (1.59) (0.70) (1.68)* 
Different Country Dum -0.005398 0.050149 0.002897 -0.253907 0.000777 -0.104719 
 (0.50) (0.13) (0.24) (0.61) (0.06) (0.25) 
Top Figures Dum -0.012185 -0.628695 0.002624 -0.885247 0.002746 -0.918595 
 (0.31) (1.07) (0.06) (1.33) (0.06) (1.38) 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.010765 0.137312 -0.011656 0.083716 -0.009163 -0.097847 
 (0.78) (0.39) (0.71) (0.21) (0.56) (0.24) 
Fraud Dum 0.001748 0.055339 0.006708 -0.189841 0.006676 -0.226245 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.47) (0.34) (0.45) (0.42) 
U.S. Firm Dum -0.002332 -0.015664 0.017068 -0.557789 0.013366 -0.286063 
 (0.19) (0.04) (1.00) (1.07) (0.75) (0.53) 
StDev Stock Return 1.119495 -1.577531 0.624937 8.025929 0.719299 1.167485 
 (1.69)* (0.09) (0.88) (0.44) (0.94) (0.06) 
Beta 0.011419 -0.333420 0.003133 -0.298315 0.006100 -0.537028 
 (1.30) (1.14) (0.28) (0.87) (0.54) (1.44) 
Float -0.000159 0.002573 -0.000393 0.000259 -0.000416 0.001865 
 (0.75) (0.42) (1.15) (0.03) (1.21) (0.17) 
Ln(Trading Volume) -0.002831 0.088325 0.000138 0.067889 -0.000030 0.086957 
 (0.65) (0.99) (0.02) (0.66) (0.01) (0.84) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.009177 -0.113764 0.006251 -0.218105 0.003395 0.016670 
 (1.59) (0.73) (0.86) (1.08) (0.51) (0.07) 
ROA 0.010354 -0.158690 -0.003274 0.183490 -0.003352 0.219453 
 (1.71)* (0.87) (0.42) (0.69) (0.48) (0.60) 
Leverage 0.003166 -0.099107 0.004084 -0.180181 0.003707 -0.147147 
 (0.46) (0.60) (0.59) (0.98) (0.52) (0.84) 
Market to Book Ratio 0.008585 -0.099447 0.013905 -0.260332 0.012591 -0.171191 
 (1.01) (0.37) (1.24) (0.82) (1.18) (0.51) 
GDP Per Capita 0.000000 0.000005 0.000000 0.000018 0.000000 0.000019 
 (0.27) (0.43) (0.54) (0.94) (0.51) (0.97) 
Constant -0.135927 1.377174 -0.176943 3.779118 -0.127062 -0.443994 
 (1.94)* (0.71) (2.12)** (1.26) (1.49) (0.15) 
R2 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.08 
N 255 255 223 223 223 223 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Debt-based Reputational Effects of Credit Ratings around Operational Risk Announcements 
This table reports the results of the 2SLS regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Model (2) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Model (3) around operational risk event announcements in 
publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-
global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). Model (1) reports the results of the first-stage regression 
estimating the endogenous variable 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)̂ . Variables description is reported in the appendix. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the regression 
coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Panel A:  Credit Rating Level 
Variables 
First-stage Regression Second-stage Regression 
(1) (2) (3) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Credit Rating Level -0.001083 10.065152 0.036700 
 (-0.115) (5.726)*** (3.432)*** 
Analyst Coverage 0.000604 -0.089736 -0.000594 
 (0.432) (-0.389) (-0.376) 
Loss Disclosed Dum 0.007644 1.174823 0.019428 
 (0.550) (0.568) (1.133) 
Firm Recognized Dum -0.026848 1.969654 0.003487 
 (-1.332) (0.578) (0.138) 
Regulatory Announced Dum 0.001202 -1.569754 -0.023628 
 (0.094) (-0.858) (-1.755)* 
Settlement Dum 0.020500 -5.412411 -0.030190 
 (1.083) (-1.657)* (-1.071) 
Different Country Dum -0.033981 0.451873 0.004700 
 (-1.633) (0.157) (0.205) 
Top Figures Dum -0.037233 9.803622 0.037481 
 (-0.987) (1.553) (0.738) 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.027568 7.430481 0.028532 
 (-1.495) (1.955)* (1.273) 
Fraud Dum 0.015491 -5.139993 -0.030015 
 (0.886) (-1.516) (-1.062) 
U.S. Firm Dum -0.028949 -4.340883 -0.029066 
 (-1.206) (-1.311) (-1.021) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.040411 -3.684138 -0.017609 
 (2.381)** (-1.259) (-0.831) 
ROA 0.008169 6.652850 0.040729 
 (0.440) (2.312)** (2.075)** 
Leverage 0.008167 -4.628701 -0.038116 
 (0.934) (-2.815)*** (-3.192)*** 
Market to Book Ratio 0.025491 -1.033899 0.000546 
 (1.342) (-0.313) (0.025) 
GDP Per Capita 0.000002 0.000004 0.000000 
 (1.273) (0.031) (0.515) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.012592   
 (-1.229)   
StDev Stock Return 1.562020   
 (1.639)   
Beta 0.024989   
 (2.059)**   
Float -0.000067   
 (-0.165)   
Ln(Trading Volume) -0.005355   
 (-1.307)   
RCAR(-5,+5)  82.349901 0.449997 
  (1.329) (1.082) 
Constant -0.681504 48.776471 0.253233 
 (-2.638)*** (1.154) (0.828) 
Observations 135 135 135 
R-squared 0.288 0.663 0.295 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments  0.0987 0.0987 
F-test of excluded instruments  2.60 2.60 
Prob > F  (0.029)** (0.029)** 
Endogeneity (Stock–Wright) test  3.27 3.39 
(p-value)  (0.6578) (0.6404) 
Overidentification (Sargan) test  0.925 1.910 
(p-value)  (0.9209) (0.7524) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Debt-based Reputational Effects of Credit Ratings around Operational Risk Announcements 
This table reports the results of the 2SLS regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Model (2) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Model (3) around operational risk event announcements in 
publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-
global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). Model (1) reports the results of the first-stage regression 
estimating the endogenous variable 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)̂ . Variables description is reported in the appendix. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the regression 
coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Panel B:  Speculative Grade 
Variables 
First-stage Regression Second-stage Regression 
(1) (2) (3) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Speculative Grade -0.012566 41.076384 0.153432 
 (-0.322) (5.730)*** (3.317)*** 
Analyst Coverage 0.000581 -0.186976 -0.000940 
 (0.421) (-0.817) (-0.600) 
Loss Disclosed Dum 0.007938 0.969042 0.018593 
 (0.566) (0.503) (1.123) 
Firm Recognized Dum -0.026789 2.215556 0.004550 
 (-1.333) (0.666) (0.180) 
Regulatory Announced Dum 0.001332 -1.423967 -0.023137 
 (0.105) (-0.796) (-1.734)* 
Settlement Dum 0.020127 -5.705293 -0.031254 
 (1.076) (-1.761)* (-1.109) 
Different Country Dum -0.034270 -0.206478 0.002517 
 (-1.651) (-0.076) (0.113) 
Top Figures Dum -0.036953 8.439892 0.032191 
 (-0.973) (1.343) (0.635) 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.026620 6.406271 0.024464 
 (-1.391) (1.696)* (1.091) 
Fraud Dum 0.015690 -4.747248 -0.028686 
 (0.899) (-1.416) (-1.016) 
U.S. Firm Dum -0.028247 -4.735311 -0.030493 
 (-1.181) (-1.450) (-1.073) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.038471 -3.150611 -0.014981 
 (2.164)** (-1.105) (-0.728) 
ROA 0.005656 5.664808 0.037849 
 (0.309) (2.041)** (1.933)* 
Leverage 0.007435 -4.427229 -0.037254 
 (0.825) (-2.691)*** (-3.136)*** 
Market to Book Ratio 0.025546 -1.609140 -0.001372 
 (1.373) (-0.498) (-0.063) 
GDP Per Capita 0.000002 0.000014 0.000000 
 (1.294) (0.098) (0.536) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.012280   
 (-1.198)   
StDev Stock Return 1.594080   
 (1.656)   
Beta 0.024157   
 (2.043)**   
Float -0.000042   
 (-0.102)   
Ln(Trading Volume) -0.005493   
 (-1.332)   
RCAR(-5,+5)  79.649196 0.444985 
  (1.269) (1.055) 
Constant -0.654624 51.773134 0.254277 
 (-2.493)** (1.285) (0.860) 
Observations 135 135 135 
R-squared 0.288 0.673 0.302 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments  0.0982 0.0982 
F-test of excluded instruments  2.46 2.46 
Prob > F  (0.0372)** (0.0372)** 
Endogeneity (Stock–Wright) test  2.12 3.10 
(p-value)  (0.8318) (0.6848) 
Overidentification (Sargan) test  0.127 1.703 
(p-value)  (0.9981) (0.7902) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Further Analysis 
This table reports the summarised further analysis results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and (3), 
the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period 
(2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the 
regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Panel A: U.S. Firms 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Buy Stock Recommendation 0.000018 0.634918       
 (0.00) (1.29)       
Buy * U.S. Firm -0.026246 0.465927       
 (1.39) (0.65)       
StDev Stock Recommendation   0.127155 -2.790527     
   (1.67)* (1.74)*     
StDev * U.S. Firm   -0.218457 4.565852     
   (2.29)** (1.77)*     
Credit Rating Level     10.645433 0.039193   
     (6.359)*** (3.649)***   
Credit Rating Level * U.S. Firm     1.270897 0.008807   
     (1.326) (1.172)   
Speculative Grade       43.793566 0.165614 
       (6.389)*** (3.561)*** 
Speculative Grade * U.S. Firm       5.176580 0.033502 
       (1.281) (1.052) 
U.S. Firm Dum 0.018821 -0.537610 0.207202 -4.560683 -5.221835 -0.036802 -4.607548 -0.030611 
 (1.16) (0.92) (2.23)** (1.91)* (-1.329) (-1.097) (-1.403) (-1.080) 
R2 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.649 0.287 0.655 0.290 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Further Analysis 
This table reports the summarised further analysis results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and (3), 
the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period 
(2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the 
regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Panel B: Fraud Incidents 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.010370 0.712295       
 (0.92) (1.85)*       
Buy * Fraud -0.008301 1.197924       
 (0.38) (1.17)       
StDev Stock Recommendation   0.069823 -1.618895     
   (0.98) (1.04)     
StDev * Fraud   -0.044939 1.383312     
   (0.41) (0.50)     
Credit Rating Level     10.509355 0.038770   
     (6.125)*** (3.670)***   
Credit Rating Level * Fraud     2.150450 0.011178   
     (2.083)** (1.465)   
Speculative Grade       43.310392 0.163619 
       (6.195)*** (3.612)*** 
Speculative Grade * Fraud       7.863285 0.040881 
       (1.821)* (1.279) 
Fraud Dum 0.011568 -0.781948 0.046091 -1.406253 -6.734044 -0.039267 -4.870047 -0.029745 
 (0.64) (0.98) (0.45) (0.54) (-1.697)* (-1.203) (-1.473) (-1.078) 
R2 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.645 0.292 0.655 0.298 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Further Analysis 
This table reports the summarised further analysis results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and (3), 
the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period 
(2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the 
regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Panel C: Basel Business Lines 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.013411 1.142254       
 (0.41) (1.54)       
Buy * Basel 0.002543 -0.377769       
 (0.07) (0.46)       
StDev Stock Recommendation   0.204507 -0.692853     
   (1.53) (0.33)     
StDev * Basel   -0.207574 -0.789340     
   (1.59) (0.33)     
Credit Rating Level     12.401650 0.048760   
     (7.352)*** (4.214)***   
Credit Rating Level * Basel     -2.274609 -0.012103   
     (-2.202)** (-1.890)*   
Speculative Grade       50.740456 0.197367 
       (7.270)*** (3.944)*** 
Speculative Grade * Basel       -8.843588 -0.038757 
       (-1.986)** (-1.711)* 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.012408 0.245325 0.184101 0.831024 8.066758 0.033914 5.558993 0.019744 
 (0.66) (0.45) (1.57) (0.35) (1.869)* (1.326) (1.537) (0.914) 
R2 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.649 0.298 0.658 0.301 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Further Analysis 
This table reports the summarised further analysis results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and (3), 
the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period 
(2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the 
regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Panel D: Top Figures 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.015849 0.895566       
 (1.69)* (2.40)**       
Buy * Top Figures 0.101297 -1.557976       
 (1.17) (1.11)       
StDev Stock Recommendation   -0.026497 -0.437111     
   (0.69) (0.31)     
StDev * Top Figures   0.414591 -5.997749     
   (2.39)** (2.19)**     
Credit Rating Level     11.009996 0.041232   
     (6.769)*** (3.938)***   
Credit Rating Level * Top Figures     -1.645419 -0.005082   
     (-1.220) (-0.457)   
Speculative Grade       44.951182 0.172262 
       (6.809)*** (3.823)*** 
Speculative Grade * Top Figures       -6.483567 -0.021211 
       (-1.099) (-0.433) 
Top Figures Dum -0.057249 -0.066644 -0.381807 4.510589 8.608418 0.029642 6.515639 0.023021 
 (1.80)* (0.06) (2.85)*** (1.69)* (1.379) (0.551) (1.199) (0.489) 
R2 0.13 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.669 0.304 0.679 0.311 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
This table reports the summarised robustness check results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and (3), 
the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period 
(2010 – 2014). In computing (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)), the ex post (settlement) loss amount is used as a correction for all events in our final sample. Other variables description is 
reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; 
*** p<0.01.  
Panel A: Settlement Loss Amount as a Correction for All Events 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.010932 0.830422       
 (1.00) (2.26)**       
StDev Stock Recommendation   0.050915 -0.655843     
   (0.87) (0.54)     
Credit Rating Level     10.915079 0.040967   
     (6.653)*** (3.901)***   
Speculative Grade       44.855220 0.172093 
       (6.705)*** (3.807)*** 
R2 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.66 0.30 0.67 0.31 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
This table reports the summarised robustness check results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and (3), 
the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period 
(2010 – 2014). Lag is the number of days since the most recent credit rating update. Other variables description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Panel B: Time Elapsed Since Last Credit Rating Update 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Credit Rating Level -0.009077 1.240572   9.923100 0.043481   
 (2.65)*** (3.85)***   (5.075)*** (3.420)***   
Credit Rating Level * Lag 0.000012 -0.001668   0.003951 -0.000004   
 (2.56)** (4.17)***   (0.937) (-0.110)   
Speculative Grade   -0.105209 16.676859   36.682414 0.144270 
   (2.97)*** (4.60)***   (4.458)*** (2.719)*** 
Speculative Grade * Lag   0.000146 -0.028645   0.028382 0.000111 
   (3.09)*** (3.84)***   (1.190) (1.031) 
Lag 0.000007 0.001223 0.000017 -0.000201 -0.002406 0.000021 -0.001436 0.000012 
 (0.53) (2.05)** (1.27) (0.45) (-0.543) (0.586) (-0.493) (0.528) 
R2 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.657 0.261 0.680 0.281 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix A: Variables Description 
Variable Name Definition Data Source(s) 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) Reputational return in the event window (-5,+5) = Cumulative abnormal stock return + |(Operational loss 
amount / Market value of the loss firm one calendar week before the announcement date)|  
Cumulative abnormal stock return in the event window (-5,+5) = ∑ 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖
5
𝑖=−5 , where 
 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 = 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖  Estimation window of the 
normal stock return is 250 trading days ending one calendar month before the announcement date. Estimation 
model is single-factor market model. Original stock prices are measured in US dollar. 
- DataStream 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0) 1 if reputational return is negative in the event window (-5,+5); 0 otherwise - DataStream 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) Cumulative abnormal CDS spread change in the event window (-5,+5) = 
∑ 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖
5
𝑖=−5 , where  𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 =
(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 − 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1) − (𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 − 𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1).  
It is measured in euros for five year duration (modified modified structure). 
DataStream 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) Cumulative abnormal CDS relative spread change in the  event window (-5,+5) = 
∑ 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖
5
𝑖=−5 , where  𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 =
(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1)
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1
−
(𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1)
𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1
  
It is measured in euros for five year duration (modified modified structure). 
DataStream 
 
Buy Stock Recommendation 1 if the median of most recent consensus stock analyst recommendations before the announcement date is 
“Buy” Recommendation; 0 otherwise 
Bloomberg 
StDev Stock Recommendation Standard deviation of most recent consensus stock analyst recommendations before the announcement date Bloomberg 
Credit Rating Level Global corporate average cumulative default rate (five-year horizon) of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term 
local issuer credit rating from 1981 to the year preceding the operational risk event announcement date. Data 
on transition matrices are collected from the “Annual Global Corporate Default Study And Rating Transitions” 
reports published annually by S&P Global. 
Bloomberg 
Speculative Grade 1 if the most recent credit rating before the operational risk event announcement date is BB+ or lower; 0 
otherwise 
Bloomberg 
Analyst Coverage Number of equity analysts following the firm (i.e. issuing EPS estimates) Bloomberg 
Loss Disclosed Dum 1 if the operational loss amount is disclosed; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Firm Recognized Dum 1 if the operational risk event is recognised by the loss firm; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Regulatory Announced Dum 1 if the operational risk event is announced by a regulatory body; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
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Settlement Dum 1 if the operational risk event is settled; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Different Country Dum 1 is the operational risk event takes place in a country different from the loss firm headquarters’ country; 0 
otherwise 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Top Figures Dum 1 if the operational risk event directly involves one or more of the board directors or chief executives; 0 
otherwise  
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Basel Business Line Dum 1 id the operational risk event is classified under one of the eight Basel II business lines: Corporate finance, 
trading and sales, retail banking, commercial banking, payment and settlement, agency services, asset 
management, retail Brokerage; 0 otherwise 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis  
Fraud Dum 1 if the operational risk event is classified as internal fraud or external fraud; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
U.S. Firm Dum 1 if the operational risk event is incurred by a U.S. firm; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis  
StDev Stock Return Standard deviation of daily stock returns for one trading year ending one calendar month before the 
announcement date  
DataStream 
Beta Monthly stock’s beta (measured at the end of calendar month preceding the announcement date) DataStream 
Float The percentage of outstanding shares available to ordinary shareholders one week before the announcement 
date 
DataStream 
Trading Volume The natural logarithm of the number of shares traded for the stock (in thousands) one week before the 
announcement date 
DataStream 
Total Assets Natural logarithm of total assets (in millions of US dollar) measured at the end of calendar quarter preceding 
the announcement date 
DataStream 
ROA Return on assets (%) DataStream 
Leverage Long-term debt / Shareholders’ equity (Decimals)  DataStream 
Market to Book Ratio Market value of equity / Book value of equity (Decimals) DataStream 
GDP Per Capita GDP per capita (in US dollar) World Bank 
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Appendix B: Credit Rating Transition Matrix 
This transition matrix summarises the global corporate average cumulative default rates (five-year horizon) of 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term local issuer credit ratings from 1981 to the years 2009 – 2013 (i.e. the years 
preceding the operational risk event announcement dates in our sample). Data on transition matrices are collected 
from the “Annual Global Corporate Default Study And Rating Transitions” reports published annually by S&P 
Global. The default rates are presented in percentages (%). 
Credit Rating 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AAA 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 
AA+ 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 
AA 0.25 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.38 
AA- 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.39 
A+ 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.53 
A 0.68 0.64 0.63 0.59 0.57 
A- 0.87 0.80 0.76 0.71 0.69 
BBB+ 1.63 1.51 1.43 1.33 1.27 
BBB 1.98 1.89 1.82 1.73 1.69 
BBB- 4.38 4.29 4.03 3.81 3.51 
BB+ 5.51 5.27 5.01 4.74 4.56 
BB 9.22 8.74 8.32 8.05 7.66 
BB- 12.14 11.52 10.96 10.75 10.33 
B+ 18.29 17.80 17.14 16.47 16.05 
B 25.09 24.40 22.87 22.04 21.02 
B- 31.05 30.00 28.76 27.98 26.93 
CCC/C 48.05 47.64 46.72 46.64 46.75 
 
 
